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COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW  
(in Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle, Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law) 
 
 
LUIS E. CHIESA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Criminal law is a parochial discipline. Courts and scholars in the English speaking world 
seldom take seriously the criminal statutes, cases and scholarly writings published in the non-
English speaking world. The same is true the other way around. This is unfortunate. Much can be 
learned from comparing the way in which the world’s leading legal systems approach important 
questions of criminal theory. This Chapter introduces the reader to comparative criminal law 
with the aim of demonstrating how comparative analysis can enrich both domestic and 
international understandings of criminal law. 
The Chapter is comprised of four parts. Part I clarifies what it means to do comparative 
criminal law and distinguishes it from similar endeavors such as compiling criminal law. Part II 
explains why engaging in comparative analysis is useful to both strengthen domestic criminal 
law doctrines and to better understand international criminal law. Part III discusses some of the 
obstacles that must be overcome in order to engage in meaningful comparative analysis. Finally, 
Part IV engages in a comparative analysis of attempt liability and mens rea in order to illustrate 
how to do comparative criminal law and the benefits that might be reaped from doing so.  
II. COMPARING CRIMINAL LAW VS. COMPILING CRIMINAL LAW 
Perhaps the most obvious way of doing comparative criminal law is by compiling the 
criminal law doctrines of different jurisdictions. This is what Markus Dubber and Kevin Heller 
attempted to do with the collection of essays that they edited in the “Handbook of Comparative 
Criminal Law”.1 Each chapter of this helpful tome surveys the criminal law of a different 
country. The chapters are particularly useful because they are authored by leading scholars in 
their respective jurisdictions. This avoids the sort of mistake that an outsider is prone to make 
when she attempts to describe the law of a foreign country.  
The problem with the useful Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law is that there is little 
comparative about it. The chapter on Argentine criminal law, for example, illustrates the basic 
principles of criminal liability invoked by courts and scholars in Argentina. The same can be said 
of the chapters on Spanish, American, Egyptian and Chinese criminal law. What is missing, 
however, is an analysis of what are the important points of contact and divergence amongst the 
different systems of criminal law discussed in the volume. How, for example, does the 
continental concept of dolus eventualis overlap with the Anglo American concept of 
recklessness? Why is it that the mental element (mens rea) for attempt liability in many 
European and Latin American countries is recklessness, while in most Anglo American countries 
it is purpose? Why is the analogical interpretation of criminal statutes prohibited in civil law 
countries but allowed in common law jurisdictions? An answer to these questions requires going 
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beyond pointing out how different countries solve these problems. It requires comparing the 
different solutions.  
This is not to say that compiling the criminal laws of different jurisdictions is useless. 
The importance of amassing materials that illustrate how foreign countries approach criminal law 
doctrines lies in their use as sources for doing comparative criminal law. Just as this chapter 
cannot be completed without making use of paragraphs, sentences and letters, there can be no 
comparative criminal law without employing source materials that illustrate how criminal law is 
approached in different jurisdictions. Ideally, comparative criminal theorists would read the 
seminal works published by the leading scholars of different countries and the statutory materials 
and case law of different jurisdictions. Unfortunately, language barriers usually make this a 
difficult task. As a result, works that survey the criminal laws of foreign countries quite often 
facilitate the task of doing comparative criminal law. Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse 
compiling with comparing. Comparing criminal laws is, by definition, the essence of 
comparative criminal law. Compiling criminal laws is useful to doing comparative criminal law, 
but is not synonymous with actually engaging in comparative analysis of substantive criminal 
law.  
II. THE USES OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW  
1. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW AS A TOOL FOR CRITICALLY ASSESSING DOMESTIC CRIMINAL 
LAW 
 It has long been argued that one of the main functions of comparative criminal law – if 
not its chief function – is to assist in domestic criminal law reform.2  Comparative criminal law 
may be useful in this regard by providing a tool with which to critically assess the domestic 
criminal law of the jurisdiction that is seeking to reform its laws. More specifically, an inquiry 
into comparative criminal law helps local actors identify instances in which their domestic 
criminal law may be in need of change. While this critical use of comparative criminal is most 
obviously relevant to legislative reform, it may also inform how the judiciary answers complex 
and important questions of domestic criminal law.  
 With regard to using comparative criminal law to fuel legislative reform, it is sensible to 
look to what other countries are doing in an effort to find novel solutions to old problems. Take, 
for example, the problem of whether and when to impose corporate criminal liability. This is an 
issue that is acquiring increasing importance in several Latin American and European countries. 
The conventionally accepted view in these countries is that punishing corporations is contrary to 
fundamental principles of criminal law, because corporations are not entities that are capable of 
behaving culpably. Given that culpability is considered to be a prerequisite for the imposition of 
criminal liability, these countries have historically rejected imposing criminal punishment on 
corporations. Nevertheless, as wrongdoing within the corporate world acquires increasing 
significance, these countries are starting to take seriously the idea of punishing corporations. It 
seems sensible that such countries consider the approaches to corporate criminal liability adopted 
in jurisdictions that – like the United States - have imposed such liability for over a hundred 
years.  
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 Comparative criminal law has also found its way into the judicial decision making 
process. In the United States, this is most obviously the case in the Supreme Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence. In Atkins v. Virginia, for example, the Supreme Court pointed out that 
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”.3 This – coupled with the fact that 
the vast majority of American jurisdictions prohibit the execution of mentally retarded offenders 
– helped support the Court’s conclusion that the practice amounts to “cruel and unusual” 
punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment. Subsequently, in Roper v. Simmons, the high 
court was asked to assess the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on a defendant who 
was a minor when he committed the offense. A majority of the members of the Supreme Court 
concluded that executing someone as punishment for a crime that was committed while under the 
age of 18 runs afoul the Eighth Amendment. In justifying its conclusion, the Court pointed out 
“that only seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 
1990”.4 While the Supreme Court conceded that the practices of other countries are not 
determinative of the meaning of the constitution of the United States, it also acknowledged that 
the Court frequently “refe[rs] to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as 
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments’”. 5  
 Finally, comparative criminal law is also useful as a tool for enriching scholarly 
enterprises. It can be used in the classroom to help students better understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the domestic system of criminal law that they are learning about. Take, for 
example, the issue of whether criminal liability should be imposed for failing to rescue a stranger 
in need of help in circumstances in which doing so would not be costly or dangerous. As every 
American law student learns early in their basic substantive criminal law course, such omissions 
typically go unpunished in the United States. This might seem unremarkable to many American 
students, especially if they have already learned that such failures to rescue do not generally give 
rise to tort liability either. While perhaps some students will notice the obvious disconnect 
between law and morality in this context, most will likely conclude that this is just the standard 
legal answer to this question. Such passive acceptance of the American reticence to punish 
omissions to aid can be challenged by venturing into the realm comparative criminal law. 
Students are often surprised when they learn that punishing failures to rescue is the norm in most 
European and Latin American countries. This, in turn, allows them to see that there need not be a 
disconnect between law and morality in this area and that the American approach to punishing 
failures to aid is by no means the universal way of thinking about this issue. The hope is that 
such comparative insights may help students broaden their perspectives and call into question 
entrenched domestic criminal law doctrines.  
2. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 International criminal law has gained increasing importance in recent years, especially 
after the adoption of the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court (ICC). Before 
the Rome Statute was adopted in 2002, general doctrines of international criminal law were not 
summarized in a single treaty and therefore slowly emerged as a result of customary law and the 
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judgments of certain international courts, such as the Nuremberg Tribunal and the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As a result, the 
adoption of rules of international criminal law to govern issues such as complicity, mens rea, 
attempt liability and general justification and excuse defenses was heavily influenced by the way 
in which these issues were addressed in domestic systems of criminal law.   
 It should come as no surprise, then, that an inquest into comparative criminal law proved 
of great importance in ascertaining the content and scope of general doctrines of international 
criminal law. International tribunals continuously make reference to the domestic criminal laws 
of different jurisdictions in order to fill gaps in international criminal law doctrines in accordance 
with the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”.6  
A particularly rich example of this is the ICTY’s judgment in Prosecutor v. Drazen 
Erdemovic.7 The defendant in Erdemovic claimed that his killing of dozens of innocent civilians 
should be excused pursuant to the defense of duress. The novel legal issue presented by the case 
was whether duress could be invoked as a defense to a crime against humanity. A majority of the 
judges of the Court ruled that duress cannot fully excuse crimes of such magnitude. An analysis 
of comparative approaches to this question proved determinative to the Court’s decision. The 
Court explained its reliance on comparative criminal law in this manner:  
In order to arrive at a general principle relating to duress, we have undertaken a limited 
survey of the treatment of duress in the world’s legal systems. This survey is necessarily 
modest in its undertaking and is not a thorough comparative analysis. Its purpose is to 
derive, to the extent possible, a “general principle of law” as a source of international 
law.8 
After surveying the law of twenty eight countries regarding this issue, the Court pointed out that 
most civil law jurisdictions seem to allow duress to be pleaded as a defense to the killing of 
innocent persons, whereas most common law jurisdictions do not. Nevertheless, it also asserted 
that the vast majority of common and civil law countries allow duress to be raised as a mitigating 
factor. Ultimately, the Court decided against allowing duress to fully excuse a crime against 
humanity. The ICTY partially justified this conclusion by pointing out that there was no 
international consensus regarding whether duress should fully excuse killings of innocent people. 
The Court, however, concluded that in light of the overwhelming consensus in favor of allowing 
duress to be considered as a ground for reducing punishment, duress ought to be admissible at 
the sentencing stage to mitigate punishment. 
 Regardless of the merits of the holding in Erdemovic,9 the case highlights the special role 
that comparative criminal law plays in international criminal law adjudication. This role is even 
more obvious after the creation of the ICC, given that pursuant to the Rome Statute, the Court 
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must apply “general principles of law derived…from national laws of legal systems of the 
world”.10  
III. CHALLENGES OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
1. THE LANGUAGE BARRIER 
 The most obvious challenge to engaging in comparative criminal law analysis is 
overcoming language barriers. While this is a problem that plagues comparative law in general, it 
is particularly acute in the case of comparative criminal law. The dearth of English translations 
of foreign criminal law cases, statutes and scholarly writings is remarkable, especially when 
German, Italian and Spanish criminal theory have achieved a very high level of sophistication. 
Similarly, the lack of translations of textbooks, articles, statutory materials and case law 
originally published in English hinders the propagation of Anglo-American criminal theory to 
jurisdictions steeped in the European Continental legal tradition.  
Perhaps because of this, it happens quite often that scholars on either side of the Atlantic 
believe that they have come up with a novel solution to a criminal law problem that – 
unbeknownst to them – has already been proposed by scholars hailing from a different legal 
tradition. Two cases immediately come to mind. Several decades ago, American criminal 
theorists Paul Robinson and George Fletcher famously debated whether and how much an 
“unknowingly justified” actor should be punished. An actor is unknowingly justified when he is 
unaware that his conduct prevents a harm that is greater than the harm caused by his act. Suppose 
that a person kills another out of spite without knowing that the person he killed was about to use 
deadly force against him. Such a killing is objectively justified pursuant to self-defense. 
However, should the actor be able to successfully plead self-defense when he was unaware that 
the killing was necessary to avert an unlawful attack? Paul Robinson forcefully argued that 
justifications are objective and – therefore – harms caused by unknowingly justified actors ought 
to be justified even if they are acting for bad reasons.11 Nevertheless, Robinson argued that 
attempt liability could be imposed, for the unknowingly justified actor tried to cause a net social 
harm but failed.12 In contrast, George Fletcher argued that justifications must be earned by the 
actor. Consequently, Fletcher contended that unknowingly justified actors should be punished for 
a completed offense, since they lack subjective awareness of the justifying factors, which is 
essential to establish that their conduct is motivated by the right reasons.13 
What is particularly interesting about this is that although Fletcher is widely considered 
in America to be heavily influenced by German criminal law theory, Robinson’s position 
regarding the unknowingly justified actor was defended by many – if not most - German 
criminal theorists well before the famous Robinson-Fletcher debate. That is, most German 
scholars argue that unknowingly justified actors should be punished for an attempt rather than for 
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a consummated crime.14 And they had done so many years prior to the famous Robinson-
Fletcher exchange. As a result, in the big scheme of things, Robinson’s position was not as novel 
as many – including Fletcher – believed it to be. This debate would have surely benefited from 
the reasoned analysis of civil law scholars who had for a long time argued that attempt liability 
ought to be imposed on unknowingly justified actors. Unfortunately, the lack of English 
translations of criminal law writings from European Continental scholars made it nearly 
impossible for American scholars to note that this debate was not as original as it seemed.  
For similar reasons, civil law scholars have failed to appreciate that some of their 
contributions to criminal law theory may not be as groundbreaking as they believe. Take, for 
example, the theory of “objective imputation” that German scholars concocted to deal with 
causation problems in borderline cases. According to the most modern version of the theory, an 
actor ought to be held accountable for resulting harm only if two conditions obtain. First, the 
actor’s conduct must create an unreasonable risk of harm. Second, the resulting harm must be the 
consequence of the particular risk created by the actor’s conduct rather than the product of a 
different risk.15  
The oft-cited facts of People vs. Acosta16 may be used to illustrate the theory of 
“objective imputation”. The police were alerted that the defendant in Acosta stole a car. A car 
chase ensued. Two police helicopters were dispatched to follow the movements of the defendant. 
Unfortunately, the helicopters crashed unto one another. Both pilots died. The issue was whether 
the defendant should be held accountable for the deaths of the pilots. According to the theory of 
“objective imputation”, the answer is straightforward. The defendant should not be held liable 
because the ex ante risk created by the defendant was possible harm to those using the roads, 
whether they be pedestrians or other drivers. However, his conduct did not create an ex ante risk 
of harm to those navigating the skies. Therefore, the resulting harm (death of helicopter pilots) 
cannot be fairly attributed to the defendant.  
Surely this conclusion will strike many Anglo-American readers as normatively 
appealing. It will not strike them, however, as novel. The notion that fair attribution of harms 
should be the product of a comparison between the ex ante risks created by the defendant and the 
risk that actually ends up producing the harm is at least as old as the venerable Palsgraf v. Long 
Island Railroad case.17 It was there that Judge Cardozo famously stated that “the risk reasonably 
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to 
others within the range of apprehension”.18  In doing so, he captured the essence of the modern 
continental doctrine of objective imputation more than forty years before the German scholar 
Claus Roxin was credited with doing so in civil law jurisdictions.  
In sum, the comparison of risks that is so essential to most modern version of the theory 
of objective imputation has been a part of the Anglo-American discourse of causation in the law 
for the better part of one hundred years. Only that it was not – and still is not - called objective 
imputation. It is called proximate or legal causation. But it is essentially the same thing.  
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Unfortunately, it is difficult to tell that this is the case. If an online search engine is used 
to look for the terms “objective imputation”, no Anglo-American case or scholarly writing will 
show up. It might then be tempting to conclude that there is no analogue to the continental theory 
of “objective imputation” in Anglo-American criminal law. This conclusion, however, would be 
wrong. This is a classic illustration of how the scholar interested in gaining comparative insight 
could easily get lost in translation. While no Anglo-American court or scholar will use the terms 
“objective imputation”, many will reference legal or proximate causation. It would thus be quite 
useful for scholars to know that the Anglo-American proximate causation inquiry is very similar 
to the European Continental “objective imputation” inquiry. Such knowledge would save them 
the time that would be invested looking in vain for objective imputation in Anglo-American 
cases and scholarly writings. It would also allow them to appreciate that the theory of objective 
imputation is not so groundbreaking after all, for a similar idea germinated in American tort law 
almost half a century before the modern risk based theory blossomed in Germany.  
The lesson to be learned from this is not that an inquest into comparative criminal law 
reveals that the Robinson-Fletcher debate is less valuable than many American scholars think it 
is or that the theory of objective imputation is less novel than many European Continental 
scholars believe. What these comparative insights highlight, however, is that we should proceed 
with a dose of scholarly humility when tackling issues of criminal law theory, for what we take 
to be a venture into uncharted theoretical territory may very well amount to traversing through 
well trodden ground if one could only look at the problem from a comparative perspective.  
The other lesson to be learned from this brief comparative foray into the problems of the 
unknowingly justified actor and the theory of objective imputation is that the scarcity of 
translations of seminal criminal law works makes it very difficult to engage in meaningful 
comparative analysis unless one is fortunate enough to be able to read the works without 
translation. Unfortunately, few people are able to do so. This highlights the importance of works 
like Dubber and Heller’s Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law. Although the contributions 
compiled in the Handbook do not truly engage in comparative analysis, each chapter usefully 
summarizes the law of a particular country. This is a wonderful source for engaging in 
comparative analysis. Nevertheless, in order for comparative criminal law to take real flight, it 
will be necessary to remedy the awful lack of translated criminal law source materials. Until this 
happens, robust comparative inquiry is destined to remain the province of the few who are able 
to overcome the challenges posed by the language barrier.  
2. THE LEGAL BARRIER – COMMON LAW VS. CIVIL LAW APPROACHES TO LEGAL REASONING 
 Another challenge for those who are interested in doing comparative criminal law is 
understanding how the legal systems being compared differ from each other in ways that may 
influence how each respective legal tradition approaches law in general and the criminal law in 
particular. While there are many ways in which common law and civil law systems vary, one 
particularly important difference is the manner in which lawyers in each jurisdiction reason their 
way through a legal problem.  
 In general, common law lawyers approach criminal law (and other areas of law) 
inductively. That is, they start with a case (or group of cases) that they are trying to resolve in a 
fair way. They decide the case in a way that seems appropriate. Similar cases are subsequently 
decided in similar ways. Eventually, a principle that explains why these cases are decided in 
similar fashion arises as a result of inductive reasoning. Common law lawyers thus move from 
specific cases to broad principles. But the principles come into being because they adequately 
account for the correct resolution of the individual cases. If cases arise in the future which cannot 
be resolved fairly by applying the principle, common law lawyers are quite amenable to revising 
or abandoning the principle if doing so is the only way of resolving a concrete case (or a group 
of cases) in an appropriate manner. Take, for example, the case of whether the torture of a 
suspect can ever be justified pursuant to the lesser evils (necessity) defense. For decades the 
position in the United States seemed to be that torture could never be justified. Nevertheless, the 
American experience with terrorism during and after the bombing of the World Trade Center has 
led to crafting so-called ticking time bomb scenarios whose proper resolution calls into question 
the long-standing principle that torture can never be justified. Faced with such ticking time bomb 
scenarios, some now argue that torturing a person may be allowed if it is the only way to acquire 
information that will help prevent a catastrophe. This, in turn, has led a group of scholars and 
practitioners to call into question the long-standing principle that torture should never be 
justified. Others oppose this move. It remains to be seen whether this discussion – with its 
underlying focus on ticking time bomb cases - will lead to a revision of the absolute principle 
against torture.  
 In contrast, civil law lawyers typically reason their way through a legal problem in 
deductive fashion. That is, they begin their analysis of a case with a seemingly applicable 
principle that is generally accepted as both sound and binding. They then apply the principle to 
the case at hand to arrive at a solution. Civil law lawyers therefore typically move from broad 
generally accepted principles to the specific resolution of concrete cases. As a result, unlike in 
common law jurisdictions, the principles are not justified because they provide intuitive 
outcomes in particular cases. Rather, the principles are justified because they are viewed as 
independently sound or binding regardless of whether they produce intuitive or counterintuitive 
solutions to particular cases. The principle is viewed as authoritative or sound if it can be derived 
from even broader legal, political or moral commitments. The torture example is once again 
illustrative. The principle that torture may never be justified pursuant to lesser evils (or any other 
justification defense) is deeply engrained in civil law jurisdictions. It is accepted as both a sound 
and binding principle of law that derives its legitimacy from a host of even broader legal and 
political commitments, including international conventions against torture. This principle 
compels the conclusion that torturing cannot be legally justified and the conclusion holds 
regardless of whether abiding by it produces unappealing or counterintuitive solutions in ticking 
time bomb scenarios. Principles are thus much more immune to revision and abandonment in 
civil law jurisdictions than they are in common law countries. This is primarily due to the fact 
that – in contrast with what occurs in common law jurisdictions – principles in European 
Continental jurisdictions are not derived inductively from the resolution of specific cases, but 
rather deductively from even broader political or moral commitments. Therefore, the fact that 
applying a given principle (torture is always wrong) may produce counterintuitive results in a 
given case (ticking time bomb scenarios) is not seen in civil law jurisdictions as a decisive or 
even a particularly strong reason for modifying the principle.  
 In sum, the way in which lawyers reason their way through legal problems in common 
and civil law jurisdictions varies considerably. This influences how much weight each legal 
tradition affords to certain principles of criminal law. Failing to understand this may lead to 
misapprehending why Anglo-American and European Continental jurisdictions are more or less 
prone to modifying long held principles of criminal law when applications of such principles 
produces counterintuitive results in certain cases.  
3. THE CULTURAL/HISTORICAL BARRIER 
 Engaging in comparative criminal law analysis is further complicated by historical and 
cultural contingencies that significantly contribute to shaping the way in which criminal laws 
have evolved in the world’s different legal systems. Many important features of Anglo-American 
criminal law, for example, cannot be fully grasped without first understanding the historical role 
of the judge in common law countries. By the same token, several significant features of civil 
law approaches to criminal law can only be fully explained by the horrifying events that the 
people of many European and Latin American states experienced while their countries were 
governed by cruel authoritarian regimes. A failure to take into account how historical 
contingencies such as these shape the legal culture of different countries quite often leads to 
misapprehending the legal system of a particular jurisdiction.  
 Take, for example, the divergent ways in which common law and civil law jurisdictions 
approach the so-called “legality principle”. This principle is at least nominally followed in both 
Anglo-American and European Continental jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the content and scope of 
the legality principle in the world’s two leading legal systems varies considerably. In civil law 
countries, for example, the legality principle prohibits using analogy to interpret criminal statutes 
in a way that is prejudicial to the defendant.19 There is no such prohibition in common law 
jurisdictions.20 What explains the difference? The explanation lies in the role that the judge has 
historically played in common law and civil law jurisdictions.  
As is well known, the law making power of courts in common law countries was so far 
reaching that at one point most offenses were “common law crimes” of judicial creation. While 
most criminal law in Anglo-American jurisdictions is now statutory and common law crimes 
have by and large been abolished, judges in common law countries still retain much more power 
than their civil law counterparts. In contrast, judicially created crimes have historically been 
rejected civil law jurisdictions, where all criminal law is statutory law. The role of the judge in 
these countries is therefore limited to interpreting already existing law rather than creating new 
law. This is why construing criminal statutes analogically is prohibited in European Continental 
jurisdictions. A court that expands a statute beyond the conventionally accepted meaning of the 
terms to encompass cases that can - by a process of analogical reasoning - be likened to the cases 
that actually fall within the clear scope of the rule is tantamount to exercising lawmaking powers. 
Wielding such judicial power is viewed with suspicion, for in civil law countries lawmaking 
authority has historically been reserved for the legislative branch of government. This stands in 
stark contrast with the role typically afforded to the judiciary in common law countries. Given 
that Anglo-American courts have traditionally wielded lawmaking authority, it does not seem 
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objectionable for the judiciary to broadly construe criminal statutes by engaging in a process of 
analogical reasoning.  
This remains the case even after the abolition of common law crimes, since the 
elimination of such offenses merely highlights that the branch of government that is primarily 
responsible for creating crimes is the legislature. In spite of the primacy now afforded to the 
legislative branch in criminal law matters, courts in common law countries continue to exercise 
residual lawmaking power in the interstices of criminal law. Thus, when criminal laws are 
drafted by the legislature in an excessively vague manner, common law courts often exercise 
their residual lawmaking powers to infuse the initially vague legal text with much needed 
precision.21 Exercising this kind of judicial power would be illegitimate in civil law jurisdictions, 
where the principle of legality requires that the legislature draft criminal statutes with sufficient 
precision from the outset. If the legislative branch fails to do so, the judiciary is barred from 
saving the statute by infusing it with the required specificity.22 Allowing courts to do so would – 
once again – confer them lawmaking authority that is incompatible with the historical role of the 
judiciary in civil law jurisdictions.  
 This succinct comparative analysis of the principle of legality reveals several nuances 
that would easily be lost if one fails to take into account the historical idiosyncrasies of common 
and civil law systems. For obvious reasons, the civil law tradition is much more committed to the 
idea that the legislature is the sole source of legitimate lawmaking authority. In contrast, the 
common law tradition is much more amenable to sharing lawmaking authority between the 
judiciary and the legislature (and even the executive). As a result of this important difference, the 
world’s two leading legal traditions approach the principle of legality in divergent ways. In 
continental jurisdictions, the principle of legality prohibits expanding the scope of criminal 
statutes by engaging in a process of analogical reasoning. No such bar exists in common law 
jurisdictions. Also, civil law countries prohibit courts from infusing vaguely drafted statutes with 
the precision that is needed to provide fair warning to citizens as to the conduct prohibited by the 
law. The principle of legality in common law countries does not prohibit doing so.  
These important differences between common law and civil law conceptions of the 
principle of legality remain largely undertheorized, probably due to the fact that it is incorrectly 
assumed that the principle of legality has the same scope in both Anglo-American and European 
Continental jurisdictions. This assumption is easily debunked once attention is paid to the link 
between the principle of legality and the proper allocation of lawmaking power between the 
different branches of government. If different legal traditions allocate lawmaking authority in 
different ways – as the civil law and common law traditions do – then it should come as no 
surprise that the principle of legality is construed differently in Anglo-American countries that 
are committed to an active judiciary than in European Continental countries that are committed 
to a more passive judicial branch.  
 An even more striking example of the importance of taking into account historical 
experiences when engaging in comparative analysis of criminal laws is the different ways in 
which common law and civil law jurisdictions approach the necessity (choice of evils) defense. 
The necessity defense justifies engaging in conduct that satisfies the elements of an offense when 
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doing so averts an evil that is greater than the one caused. The balancing of evils is usually 
straightforward. A person may, for example, justifiably break a window of a car in order to save 
a child who is suffocating inside the vehicle. Although such conduct satisfies the elements of the 
offense of criminal damages, the evil averted (death of the child) clearly outweighs the evil 
inflicted (damage to the vehicle’s window). In some cases, however, the balance of evils is not 
clear cut. This is especially the case when the harm inflicted is the death of an innocent person. It 
is unclear, for example, whether killing an innocent person should be justified as a lesser evil 
because it prevents the death of two innocent people.  
 Interestingly, common law and civil law jurisdictions have taken different approaches to 
solving the balancing question in these cases, especially in the last several decades. During the 
second half of the twentieth century, the American approach to this question has shifted 
decidedly in favor of allowing – at least in principle – an actor to claim that the killing of an 
innocent human being is justifiable because it was necessary to avert the deaths of even more 
people. While there are no recent American cases directly on point, the drafters of the influential 
Model Penal Code certainly believed this to be the correct interpretation of the Code’s choice of 
evils provision.23 Support in the scholarly literature in favor of the proposition that taking 
innocent life is justified if it saves more lives is also growing in Anglo-American scholarly 
literature.24 A similar principle also seems to underlie a relatively recent judgment of the Court 
of Appeal of England and Wales in which the court authorized severing conjoined twins in a way 
that would kill one of the twins in order to save the other.25  
 Scholars in civil law jurisdictions have, on the other hand, continuously rejected 
justifying conduct that sacrifices innocent human life even when doing so is necessary to save 
more lives than the ones sacrificed. Their position is summed up by Andenaes, a famous 
Norweigan criminal theorist, in the following manner: “[e]ven though many lives could be saved 
by the sacrifice of one, this would hardly be justifiable…[for it] would conflict with the general 
attitude toward the inviolability of human life to interfere in this way with the course of 
events.”26 This approach is so deeply ingrained in the legal culture of civil law countries, that it 
has been expressly incorporated into some domestic criminal codes. Thus, for example, the 
choice of evils defense as defined in the Puerto Rican Penal Code justifies conduct only when the 
“evil caused is considerably inferior to the one averted and it does not entail causing either death 
or grave and permanent harm to the physical integrity of a person”.27 This viewpoint was also at 
the core of the relatively recent decision of the German Constitutional Court striking down a 
statute that authorized downing a commercial airplane headed towards a heavily populated 
area.28 The statute was struck down in spite of the German government’s argument that shooting 
down planes in those circumstances ought to be justified because it saves more lives than the 
ones sacrificed. According to the German high court, the problem with this is that it is 
incompatible with the basic right to dignity and life recognized in the German Basic Law 
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because it treats the lives of the plane’s passengers as mere objects or instruments that can be 
used to bring about good consequences.  
 What explains the widely divergent civil law and common law views regarding the 
justifiability of sacrificing innocent life in order to maximize the number of lives saved? While 
there surely are several explanations for this, there is a historical reason that cannot be ignored 
when trying to make sense of this divergence. During the twentieth century, many citizens of 
European and Latin American countries suffered through the harrowing experience of being 
governed by authoritarian leaders who committed unimaginable atrocities upon large swaths of 
the civilian population. The atrocities were quite widespread in scope. In many countries – 
including Guatemala and Germany – members of certain groups were systematically killed. In 
other countries – like Argentina, Chile and Spain – tens of thousands of citizens disappeared 
during the course of bloody military dictatorships.  
 The historical contrast with most Anglo-American countries is stark. Although some of 
the leading common law countries fought bloody wars during the course of the twentieth 
century, few had to endure the commission of atrocities that are similar in scale to the ones 
experienced by citizens of many European and Latin American countries. Few had to face 
governmental abuses in which marginalized sectors of the population were slaughtered or 
kidnapped in the name of the common good of the country. These disparate experiences account 
– at least in part – for the skepticism with which European and Latin American countries view 
the claim that it is sometimes worthwhile to sacrifice the lives of few for the benefits of the 
many. While the theoretical plausibility of this position is evident, the harrowing history that 
citizens of many civil law countries had to bear makes the population of these jurisdictions 
shudder at the thought of allowing people to claim that killing innocents may sometimes be 
beneficial for the aggregate welfare of the community.  
It is not, of course, that citizens, scholars and legal actors in civil law countries fail to 
grasp the cogent consequentialist arguments that militate in favor of justifying the killing of 
some innocent persons in order to save many more. It is that - notwithstanding how persuasive 
such arguments may seem when examined in the abstract – history has taught them that whatever 
benefit may be reaped by justifying actors who take innocent life in order prevent even greater 
harm is simply outweighed by the potential for abuse inherent in authorizing such awesome 
power. This is why consequentialist justifications of the sort that appeal to American scholars 
and the drafters of the Model Penal Code ring hollow to many scholars in Europe and Latin 
America. When what people are capable of doing in the name of the law and the common good 
when motivated perverse ideals is personally witnessed, it is quite natural to think twice before 
expanding the scope of claims that might be invoked by the government (and others) to justify 
taking innocent life. Those who lack firsthand experience of how insufferable “man’s 
inhumanity to man” can be simply cannot see this as clearly as those who do.  
It is very difficult to assess the relative merits of the divergent solutions offered to the 
problem of whether to justify some killings of innocent civilians without accounting for the 
important historical and cultural differences between common law and civil law countries 
mentioned here. Common law scholars approach the question of whether necessity ought to 
sometimes justify killings of innocent people from a mostly philosophical perspective. In 
contrast, civil law scholars tackle the question mostly by drawing lessons from their historical 
experiences, even if the lessons cannot be easily squared with consequentialist philosophy. It is 
easy to lose sight of these nuances if the issue is approached without giving proper weight to the 
historical and cultural factors that shape the content and scope of legal rules in the systems that 
are being compared.  
IV. DOING COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW – TWO EXAMPLES 
This section actually engages in comparative analysis of certain criminal law doctrines. 
The purpose of doing so is to provide concrete examples that illustrate how to do comparative 
criminal law. An additional goal is to demonstrate how engaging in comparative analysis can 
lead to a better understanding of how and why domestic criminal law takes its current shape.  
The section begins by comparing common law and civil law approaches to attempt liability. It 
then turns to exploring mens rea from a comparative perspective, with specific emphasis on the 
differences between the continental mental state of dolus eventualis and the Anglo-American 
mental state of recklessness.  
1. CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 
 Failed attempts to consummate an offense are punished in both civil and common law 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in how the world’s two leading legal 
systems approach both the objective (actus reus) and subjective elements (mens rea) of 
punishable attempts. Before discussing the specific differences between both systems in this 
context and the reasons that might explain such differences, it is useful to briefly outline the most 
important issues that must be addressed by any jurisdiction that is interested in developing a 
coherent theory for imposing attempt liability.  
 Most of the specific offenses listed in the special part of criminal codes criminalize 
successfully engaging in certain conduct or causing a particular result. Thus, the offense of rape 
prohibits engaging in non-consensual sexual intercourse. The offense of homicide criminalizes 
causing the death of a human being. In both cases, the prohibited act is effectively engaging in 
either the prohibited conduct (engaging in non-consensual sexual intercourse in the case of rape) 
or successfully bringing about the proscribed harm (death in the case of homicide). The special 
part of criminal codes usually prescribes punishment only for those who complete the conduct 
described in the definition of the offense. The consequence of this is that those who try but fail to 
engage in the conduct proscribed by the offense do not, strictly speaking, perform an act that is 
prohibited by the law defining the criminal offense. Nevertheless, there are powerful 
consequentialist and retributive reasons for punishing those who try to engage in criminal 
conduct but (fortunately) do not succeed. That is, we have good reasons to punish those who try 
but fail to kill and those who try but fail to rape. The doctrine of attempt liability was created to 
address this gap in the law. Pursuant to this general doctrine, criminal liability attaches whenever 
someone tries to commit an offense but fails to successfully consummate it. The world’s leading 
systems of criminal law are in general agreement up to this point. The similarities, however, end 
here.  
 The first point of divergence has to do with determining the exact point in time during 
which conduct crosses the threshold from being a mere act of preparation that generally goes 
unpunished to being an act of execution of the criminal offense that is typically punished as an 
attempt. This is the problem inherent in figuring out what the objective element (actus reus) of 
attempt offenses should be. It is a particularly thorny problem, given that often many events take 
place between the time during which the actor first contemplates the commission of the offense 
and the moment in which the offense is completed. Many things happen, for example, between 
the time that the actor thinks about poisoning the victim and the moment in which the actor 
actually poisons and kills the victim. When exactly did the actor’s conduct become a punishable 
attempt? When he contemplated killing the victim? When he called a friend to ask for help? 
When he browsed the web looking for a poison with which to kill the victim? When he bought 
the poison? When he drove to the victim’s home? When he entered the home? When he poisoned 
the coffee?  
 Until the second half of the twentieth century, both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions distinguished unpunished acts of preparation from punishable acts of execution in 
very similar ways. There was generalized consensus in Anglo-American and European 
Continental literature and case law that attempts to commit offenses should only be punished if 
they come dangerously close to completion. Anglo-American courts and commentators 
suggested that the act must be “dangerously proximate” to completion29 or that the actor must 
engage in the “last act” prior to consummation of the offense.30 Similarly, continental scholars 
argued that only acts “immediately prior to engaging in conduct that satisfies the elements of an 
offense”31 or that “place the victim in danger” 32 should be punished as attempts. Regardless of 
the specific standard invoked, however, attempts were typically punished only when the actor 
came very close to consummating the offense. Applying these tests to the facts in the 
abovementioned example, the actor would probably not be punished for an attempt until at least 
when he enters the victim’s home. The acts of browsing the web to look for poison, buying the 
poison and driving up to the victim’s home would very likely remain unpunished.  
 This generalized consensus started eroding after the publication in the United States of 
the Model Penal Code in 1962. According to Section 5.01 of the Code, an actor’s conduct is 
punished as an attempt if it amounts to a “substantial step” in furtherance of the eventual 
commission of the offense. The acts that count as a substantial step are quite broad and are often 
far removed both in time and space from the actual consummation of the crime. Examples of acts 
that count as substantial steps include buying a weapon for use in a murder, reconnoitering the 
place that will be robbed and driving around town looking for the person that will be mugged. 
None of these acts would likely be punished as an attempt in civil law jurisdictions. They would 
also not seem to amount to criminal attempts in common law countries prior to the publication of 
the Model Penal Code.  
 The substantial step test quite often leads to imposing attempt liability for conduct that is 
not close or proximate to the completion of the crime and that has in no way endangered the 
potential victim of the offense. Also, unlike the tests that draw the line between preparation and 
execution closer to consummation, the substantial step test focus more on the substantiality of 
the acts that were done by the actor rather than on the importance of the acts that remain to be 
done. The influence of the Model Penal Code’s substantial step test has been considerable. Over 
half of the states in America follow a version of this test, as well as close to two thirds of the 
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.  
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 The scope of attempt liability has not been broadened in similar fashion in continental 
jurisdictions. This recent divergence in the punishment of attempts calls for an explanation. Why 
were the common law and civil law approaches to the actus reus of attempt liability so similar 
for so long and why have they now started diverging?  
 A possible explanation for this is that, during the course of the twentieth century, 
common law countries began to focus more on the actor’s subjective culpability and less on 
harm causation as a proxy for when punishment is warranted. This was especially the case with 
the influential Model Penal Code, which was more concerned with identifying dangerous 
individuals than with redressing the harm caused by the offense.33 This trend was not as 
pronounced in civil law countries. The vast majority of continental scholars have advocated 
during the last several decades for a criminal law that is designed primarily to redress harm 
caused to legally protected interests.34 In words frequently echoed in continental scholarly 
literature, the criminal law should be concerned with acts rather than actors.35 As a result, the 
focus of attempt liability in civil law countries continues to be whether there has been an act that 
endangers a legally protected interest rather than whether the actor has revealed that he is 
dangerous and in need of correction. In contrast, the focus in many common law jurisdictions – 
especially the United States – shifted to assessing the subjective culpability and dangerousness of 
the actor. This has led to casting a wider net of attempt liability with the hope of identifying and 
neutralizing dangerous actors way before they come close to causing harm.  
 There are also differences in the common law and civil law approaches to the subjective 
element (mens rea) of attempt liability. In Anglo-America, attempt liability is usually imposed 
only if the actor had the purpose of bringing about the harm prohibited by law. Liability for 
attempts thus presupposes that the actor’s conscious objective be causing the state of affairs that 
is proscribed by the statute. On the other hand, it is increasingly the case in continental 
jurisdictions that an actor may be held liable for an attempt as long as he acts recklessly with 
regard to the possibility of harm.36  Things were not always this way. Until late in the twentieth 
century, there was much debate in some continental jurisdictions regarding whether the 
subjective element of attempts should be recklessness or purpose.37  
  In this context, the civil law approach generates broader attempt liability than the 
common law approach. While in continental jurisdictions attempt liability may be imposed when 
the defendant acts with purpose, knowledge or recklessness, in Anglo-American jurisdictions 
liability may only be imposed when the defendant acts purposely. This is particularly interesting 
because the continental rules governing the actus reus of attempts are significantly restrictive 
when compared with the more permissive Anglo-American rules, especially the ones modeled on 
the substantial step test. The end result is that there has been an expansion in the scope of attempt 
liability in both continental and common law countries. Only that the expansion of attempt 
liability in common law jurisdictions is mostly the product of watering down the objective 
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element of attempts, while the expansion in civil law jurisdictions is primarily the result of 
watering down the subjective element of attempts.  
But why have common and civil law jurisdictions expanded attempt liability by focusing 
on different elements? Once again, it seems dependent on whether attempt liability is viewed as a 
tool for identifying dangerous actors in need of correction or if attempts are conceived as a way 
of punishing those who have endangered someone. As a mechanism for identifying dangerous 
individuals, attempt liability should focus mostly on the actor’s subjective culpability. Whether a 
person was actually endangered by the defendant’s conduct is only mildly relevant to assessing 
the defendant’s dangerousness. Ultimately what matters is whether the actor’s purpose to engage 
in criminal conduct was sufficiently firm to warrant an inference that he might consummate the 
offense if left to his own devices. This is the view that garnered much support in Anglo-
American jurisdictions during the second half of the twentieth century. And it explains why 
common law courts have largely refused to water down the subjective culpability requirements 
while simultaneously broadening the scope of the objective elements of attempts. In contrast, if 
attempt liability is viewed as a vehicle for punishing those who place people in danger, the focus 
shifts from subjective culpability to whether the actor’s conduct actually endangered the victim. 
According to this view, whether the actor was firmly set on completing a criminal offense is not 
the central feature of attempt liability. What is determinative is whether the conduct came 
sufficiently close to completion as to create a real risk of harm. This explains why civil law 
courts and commentators are loath to water down the objective elements of attempts, while they 
are generally willing to punish attempts even when the actor’s purpose is not to commit an 
offense.  
2. MENS REA – RECKLESSNESS VS. DOLUS EVENTUALIS 
 In European Continental jurisdictions, the most watered down form of intentional 
conduct is “dolus eventualis”. In order for a defendant to act with dolus eventualis he must be 
aware that his conduct creates an unjustifiable risk of harm. In addition to awareness, however, 
acting with dolus eventualis has traditionally required a certain kind of attitude with regard to the 
risk created. There is no consensus regarding the kind of attitude that is relevant. For some, the 
actor must convince himself that he would act even if the consequence of the act is producing the 
proscribed harm.38 The actor thus “accepts” the causation of harm as a possible outcome and acts 
in spite of such awareness. For others, what matters is indifference rather than acceptance. 
According to this view, a defendant acts with dolus eventualis if he is aware that his conduct 
creates an unjustifiable risk of harm and he is indifferent as to whether the harm takes place.39 
 In contrast, a defendant who is aware that his conduct creates a risk of harm but is not 
indifferent to it acts with what continental scholars call conscious negligence. In such cases the 
defendant actually believes that the harm will not transpire because he trusts that he will be able 
to prevent it by making use of special skills or knowledge.40 Therefore, the difference between a 
defendant who acts with dolus eventualis and one who acts with conscious negligence is not 
whether they are aware of the risks created by their conduct. The difference lies in the attitude 
that the defendant adopts towards the risk that he creates. In cases of dolus eventualis, the actor 
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is not confident that he will be able to prevent the harm from taking place and he does not care 
whether it materializes or not. On the other hand, in cases of conscious negligence the defendant 
is confident that he will be able to prevent the harm that is risked by his conduct.  
 Differentiating dolus eventualis from conscious negligence is essential to discriminating 
between intentional and negligent conduct in civil law countries, for dolus eventualis is 
considered the most watered down form of intent, whereas conscious negligence is considered a 
type of negligence. Consequently, the difference between acting with dolus eventualis or 
conscious negligence is of significant practical import. This is because in continental 
jurisdictions negligent conduct usually remains unpunished. Furthermore, when negligent 
wrongdoing is criminalized, it is typically punished significantly less than intentional 
wrongdoing.  
   Although the distinction between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence is central to 
the way in which civil law jurisdictions approach the mens rea of offenses, the distinction never 
found its way into common law countries. The mental state known as recklessness is probably 
the closest Anglo-American analogue. According to the Model Penal Code, a defendant acts 
recklessly if he is aware that his conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm.41 
Recklessness is a central concept in Anglo-American criminal law, for it defines the limits 
between advertent and inadvertent wrongdoing. The distinction is important, given that 
inadvertent wrongdoing is seldom punished in common law jurisdictions.42 Moreover, in the few 
instances in which inadvertent wrongdoing is punished it is usually punished much less severely 
than advertent wrongdoing.  
The difference between recklessness and the continental mental states of dolus eventualis 
and conscious negligence is that a defendant acts recklessly as long as he is aware that his 
conduct creates an unjustifiable risk of harm, regardless of whether he is indifferent to the harm 
or trusts that he will be able to prevent it by employing special skills. In contrast, whether a 
defendant acts with dolus eventualis or conscious negligence ultimately hinges on whether he is 
indifferent to the harm or whether he trusts that he will be able to prevent it. As a result, the 
Anglo-American mental state of recklessness encompasses both dolus eventualis and conscious 
negligence.  
The following table illustrates the differences between the continental mental states of 
dolus eventualis and conscious negligence and the common law mental state of recklessness:  
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In light of the differences between these mental states, certain cases may generate 
significantly different criminal liability depending on whether they are approached from the civil 
law or the common law perspective. Take, for example, the facts that gave rise to the Puerto 
Rican case of Pueblo v. Colón Soto.43 Two friends were having drinks at a local bar. After a 
couple of cocktails, the defendant suggested that he could shoot his friend’s hat off with a single 
gunshot. The friend agreed to stand motionless and allow the defendant to shoot. The defendant’s 
shot missed the hat, but reached the friend’s head, killing him. Defendant was charged with 
intentional homicide. Defense counsel argued, however, that he should be convicted of negligent 
homicide.  
The Puerto Rican Supreme Court concluded that the defendant could be held liable for 
intentional homicide because attempting to shoot a baseball cap from someone’s head is an act 
that is rife with danger. From this, the fact finder could reasonably infer that the defendant was 
aware that his act created an unjustifiable risk of death. This is the way the case would usually by 
approached in Anglo-American jurisdictions. The defendant acted recklessly because he was 
aware that his act unreasonably endangered another person’s life. Consequently, defendant could 
be held liable for advertent wrongdoing, which is punished significantly more than inadvertent 
wrongdoing.  
The case might very well be decided differently in continental jurisdictions, given that 
awareness of the risk created by the conduct is not enough to trigger the more significant liability 
that attaches for acting with dolus eventualis. In addition, the actor must be indifferent as to 
whether the harm ensues. Although it is unclear whether the defendant in Colón Soto was 
indifferent to his friend’s death, there are a couple of facts that suggest that he was not. First, the 
defendant seemed fairly confident in his ability to shoot his friend’s hat off without causing him 
physical harm. Second, people are generally not indifferent to whether they kill their friends. As 
a result, the evidence probably supports an inference that the defendant trusted that he would not 
kill his friend. This suggests that it could plausibly be argued that the defendant acted with 
conscious negligence rather than dolus eventualis. If so, defendant could be convicted of 
negligent homicide, even if the court is convinced that he was aware that his conduct created an 
unjustifiable risk of death. Convicting a defendant in circumstances such as these of negligent 
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homicide would be difficult to imagine in Anglo-America. At the very least, such conduct would 
be punished as reckless homicide, if not murder.44  
Interestingly, it seems that in recent years the distinction between dolus eventualis and 
conscious negligence is increasingly being called into question. The charge is led mostly by the 
continental courts and scholars that defend the so called “probability theory” of dolus eventualis. 
According to the this theory, a defendant acts with dolus eventualis when he accurately perceives 
the danger created by his conduct and acts in spite of having such awareness.45 In contrast, a 
defendant acts with conscious negligence when he fails to correctly assess the danger created by 
his conduct. In its most extreme version, the theory leads to a finding of intent whenever the 
actor is aware that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm. Many scholars throughout 
the civil law realm have endorsed a version of this theory of dolus eventualis.46 Some courts are 
starting to follow suit.47 
If this trend continues, the differences between the civil law mental state of dolus 
eventualis and the common law mental state of recklessness will become less meaningful. This is 
perhaps one of the instances in which what has traditionally been considered a point of 
divergence between Anglo-American and continental law criminal may ultimately end up being 
a point of convergence. Somewhat surprisingly, if this were to happen it will mostly be the 
consequence of continental scholars and courts abandoning or rethinking the traditional approach 
to dolus eventualis rather than Anglo-American courts and scholars supplementing recklessness 
with additional mental states such as “acceptance” or “indifference”.  
The reasons underlying this rethinking of dolus eventualis in continental jurisdictions are 
fairly evident. First, it is unclear whether the actor who is aware that his conduct creates a risk of 
harm but is indifferent towards whether it takes place is significantly more worthy of blame than 
the actor who is similarly aware of the risk but trusts that he will be able to prevent it. Why 
should the law favor those who consciously engage in risky undertakings while foolishly 
believing that harm will not result? Second, it will often be very difficult to prove whether 
someone was aware of a risk but indifferent to it or whether he was aware but thought that he 
could prevent it. Requiring prosecutors to prove indifference/acceptance in addition to awareness 
imposes a probative burden in circumstances in which it is unclear whether the benefits of doing 
so outweigh the evidentiary costs that requiring such proof creates. This problem is compounded 
in jurisdictions that have jury trials. If the distinction between dolus eventualis and conscious 
negligence has baffled judges and scholars for decades, it is difficult to imagine how much added 
confusion it would sow in the minds of juries.  
It is thus not surprising that support for the traditional way of distinguishing between 
dolus eventualis and conscious negligence is waning in continental jurisdictions. What is 
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surprising, however, is that this erosion of support has gone relatively unnoticed in Anglo-
America, especially given that the trend in civil law countries seems to be to move towards 
something more akin to the common law mental state of recklessness. In fact, the continental 
experience with dolus eventualis is sometimes cited in Anglo-America as proof that adding 
“acceptance” or a functionally equivalent mental element to recklessness is a sensible and 
workable proposition.48 The history of dolus eventualis suggests otherwise. Civil law courts and 
scholars have struggled so mightily with dolus eventualis that many are now slowly redefining it 
in a way that eliminates reference to “acceptance” or similar mental states. It is thus problematic 
to propose that Anglo-America move in the direction of dolus eventualis when those who have 
embraced it for so many decades are beginning to move away from it.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 There is much use to approaching criminal law from a comparative perspective. The 
relevance of comparative criminal law to international criminal law is obvious. While less 
evident, engaging in comparative analysis may also be relevant in the domestic context. A lot 
can be learned from understanding how foreign legal systems have tackled important issues of 
criminal theory. Doing so may help local actors identify criminal law doctrines that are in need 
of change. It may also aid domestic courts in construing constitutional provisions related to 
substantive criminal law. Although the benefits of engaging in such comparative analysis may be 
considerable, it is important to proceed cautiously when comparing the criminal laws of different 
jurisdictions. Language barriers make access to foreign sources of criminal law difficult. 
Additionally, the content and scope of the criminal laws of a foreign jurisdiction cannot be fully 
comprehended without taking into account the historical and cultural contingencies that helped 
shape such laws. Nevertheless, expending the effort that is necessary to overcome these obstacles 
is worth it. As this Chapter’s discussion of dolus eventualis and recklessness illustrates, 
comparative analysis allows rethink current approaches to criminal law in light of the 
experiences that others have had dealing with similar problems. Furthermore, as this Chapter’s 
brief comparative survey of attempt liability reveals, comparative criminal law offers an 
opportunity to better understand why domestic criminal law takes its current shape.  
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